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4. THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA
A. Development of the Nazi Program of Aggression.
In the period 1933-1936 the conspirators had initiated a
program of rearmament designed to give the Third Reich
military strength and political bargaining power to be used
against other nations.
Furthermore, beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked on
a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out,
was to last until March 1939. This program was intended to
shorten Germany's frontiers, to increase its industrial and
food reserves, and to place it in a position, both
industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis could
launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of
aggression. At the moment, in the early spring of 1938, when
the Nazi conspirators first began to lay concrete plans for
the conquest of Czechoslovakia they had reached
approximately the halfway point in this preliminary program.
The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reichs
Chancellery on 5 November 1937, Hitler had set forth the
program which Germany was to follow. The events of this
conference are contained in the so-called Hossbach minutes.
The question for Germany, as the Fuehrer had informed his
military commanders at this meeting, is where the greatest
possible conquest can be
[Page 516]
made at the lowest cost (386-PS). At the top of his agenda
stood two countries: Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 12 March
1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the
following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come
for a redefinition of German intentions toward
Czechoslovakia.
A little more than a month later Hitler and Keitel met to
discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the
Czechoslovak State. On 22 April 1938, Hitler and Keitel
discussed the pretexts which Germany might develop to serve
as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They
considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic
squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to the
excuse for war. In the alternative, and this alternative
they found to be preferable, they planned to unleash a
lightning attack as the result of an "incident" of their own
creation. Consideration was given to the assassination of
the German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite
incident. The necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct
of Germans in Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs
was recognized. Problems of transport and tactics were
discussed with a view to overcoming all Czechoslovak
resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with
a fait accompli and forestalling outside intervention. (388-
PS, Item 2)
Thus in mid-April 1938 the designs of the Nazi conspirators
to conquer Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of
practical planning.
B. The Background of Friendly Diplomatic Relations.
This conspiracy must be viewed against a background of
amicable German-Czech diplomatic relations. Although they
had in the fall of 1937 determined to destroy the
Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German government
were bound by a treaty of arbitration and by assurances
freely given to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.
By a formal treaty signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925,
Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain exceptions,
to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court
of International Justice,
" *** all disputes of every kind between Germany and
Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in
conflict as to their respective rights, and which it
may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal
methods of diplomacy. *** (TC-14)
The preamble of this treaty stated:
"The President of the German Empire and the President
of the Czechoslovak Republic; equally resolved to
maintain
[Page 517]
peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring
the peaceful settlement of differences which might
arise between the two countries; declaring that respect
for the rights established by treaty or resulting from
the law of nations is obligatory for international
tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights of a
State cannot be modified save with its consent; and
considering that sincere observance of the methods of
peaceful settlement of international disputes permits
of resolving, without recourse to force, questions
which may become the cause of division between States;
have decided to embody in a treaty their common
intentions in this respect. ***" (TC-14)
Formal and categoric assurances of their good will toward
Czechoslovakia were forthcoming from the Nazi conspirators
as late as March 1938. On 11 March 1938 and 12 March 1938,
at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had a
considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to
mobilize. At this time Goering assured M. Mastny, the
Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German
Government that German-Czech relations were not adversely
affected by the developments in Austria and that Germany had
no hostile intentions toward Czechoslovakia. As a token of
his sincerity Goering accompanied his assurance with-the
statement: "Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort" ("I give you my
word of honor") (TC-27). At the same time on Neurath, who
was handling German foreign affairs during Ribbentrop's stay
in London, assured M. Mastny on behalf of Hitler and the
German government that Germany still considered herself
bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925 (TC-27).
C. Planning for Aggression.
Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators
proceeded with their military and political plans for
aggression. Ever since the preceding fall it had been
established that the immediate aim of German policy was the
elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In both countries
the Nazi conspirators planned to undermine the will to
resist by propaganda and by fifth column activities, while
the actual military preparations were being developed. The
Austrian operation, which received priority for political
and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March
1938. Thenceforth Wehrmacht planning was devoted to Case
Green Fall Gruen), the designation given to the operation
against Czechoslovakia.
The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in
outline form as early as June 1937. The OKW top secret
"Directive
Page 518]
for the Unified Preparation of the Armed Forces for War",
signed by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 and promulgated to
the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year beginning 1 July
1937, included as a probable warlike eventuality, for which
a concentration plan was to be drafted, Case Green ("War on
two fronts with the main struggle in the southeast") (C-
175). The original section of this directive dealing with
the "probable war" against Czechoslovakia -- it was later
revised -- opens with this supposition:
"The war in the east can begin with a surprise German
operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the
imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The
necessary conditions to justify such an action
politically and in the eyes of international law must
be created beforehand." (C-175)
After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event
of such action, the directive continues as follows:
"2. The task of the German Armed Forces is to make
their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all
forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by
surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the
West the minimum strength is provided as rear cover for
this attack.
"The aim and object of this surprise attack by the
German Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the
very beginning, and for the duration of the war, the
threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations
in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the
most substantial portion of its operational base in
Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the
enemy armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and
Moravia." (C-175)
The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its
guiding principles the following statement:
"The politically fluid world situation, which does not
preclude surprising incidents, demands constant
preparedness for war on the part of the German Armed
Forces *** to make possible the military exploitation
of politically favorable opportunities should they
occur." (C-175)
It ordered further work on the plan for mobilization without
public announcement "in order to put the Armed Forces in a
position to be able to begin a war suddenly which will take
the enemy by surprise both as regards strength and time of
attack." (C-175). This directive is, of course, a directive
for staff planning. But the nature of the planning, and the
very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from
it, give it a significance that it would not have in another
setting.
[Page 519]
Planning along the lines of this directive was carried
forward during the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-1938.
On the political level this planning for the conquest of
Czechoslovakia received the approval and support of Hitler
in the conference with his military commanders-in-chief on
November 1937 (386-PS). In early March 1938, before the
march into Austria, Ribbentrop and Keitel were concerned
over the extent of the information about war aims against
Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938
Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for Keitel's
confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference with
Sztojay, the Hungarian ambassador to Germany, who had
suggested an interchange of views (2786-PS). An
acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter was signed by
Keitel on 5 March. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we
should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against
Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as
well would be informed about this. I would greatly
appreciate it if you would notify me briefly whether
any commitments were made here in any respect." (2786-
PS)
D. Development of Specific Plans.
At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, specific
plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for
the first time (388-PS, Item 2). This meeting was followed
in the late spring and summer of 1938 by a series of
memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green. These notes
and communications were carefully filed at Hitler's
headquarters by Major Schmundt, the Fuehrer's military
adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar
at Obersalzberg, Hitler's headquarters, near Berchtesgaden.
This file, preserved intact, is document (388-PS).
The individual items in this file tell more graphically than
any narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators'
planning to launch an unprovoked war against Czechoslovakia.
From the start the Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest
in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovak armament and
defense. This interest is reflected in Item 4 of the
Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler in General
Jodl's office of the OKW to Schmundt at Hitler's
headquarters; Item A 12, Short survey of Armament of the
Czech Army, dated Berlin 9 June 1938 and initialed "Z" for
Zeitzler; and item 1, Questions of the Fuehrer, dated
Berlin, 9 June 1938 and classified "Most Secret". The
following are four of the questions on which Hitler wanted
authoritative information:
[Page 520]
"Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?
"Question 2: How many battalions, etc., are employed in
the West for the construction of emplacements ?
"Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia
still occupied in unreduced strength?
"Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?" (388-PS,
Item 13)
These questions were answered in detail by the OKW and
initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl's staff.
As a precaution against French and British action during the
attack on Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi
conspirators to rush the preparation of fortification
measures along the western frontier of Germany. A telegram,
presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin,
read in part as follows:
"Inform Colonel General von Brauchitsch and General
Keitel: *** The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the
necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification
work in the west." (388-PS, Item 8)
In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between
Hitler and his political and military advisers resulted in
the issuance of a series of constantly revised directives
for the attack. It was decided that preparations for X-day,
the day of the attack, should be completed no later than 1
October.
On the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference
of his principal military and political advisers in the
winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin. This
conference was the occasion on which Hitler made known to
the inner circle of the Nazi conspirators the outlines of
his plan to attack Czechoslovakia a.nd issued the necessary
instructions. The meeting is described in an affidavit of
Fritz Wiedemann, who at that time was Hitler's adjutant:
"FRITZ WIEDEMANN, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says as follows:
"From the month of January 1935 to January 1939 I
served as adjutant to Hitler. In this time my duties
were to handle correspondence and complaints addressed
to the Fuehrer's office. Occasionally I attended
conferences held by the Fuehrer.
"I recall that on the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler
called a conference in the winter garden of the Reichs
Chancellery of all the people who were important, from
the Foreign Office, the Army, and the Command Staffs.
Those present at this conference, as I recall, included
Goering, Ribbentrop, von Neurath, General Beck, Admiral
Raeder, General Keitel,
[Page 521]
and General von Brauchitsch. On this occasion Hitler
made the following statement: 'It is my unshakable will
that Czechoslovakia shall be wiped off the map.' Hitler
then revealed the outlines of the plan to attack
Czechoslovakia. Hitler addressed himself to the
Generals, saying: 'So, we will first tackle the
situation in the East. Then I will give you three to
four years' time, and then we will settle the situation
in the West.' The situation in the West was meant to be
the war against England and France.
"I was considerably shaken by these statements, and on
leaving the Reichs Chancellery I said to Herr von
Neurath: 'Well, what do you say to these revelations ?'
Neurath thought that the situation was not so serious
as it appeared and that nothing would happen before the
spring of 1939.
"/s/ Fr. Wiedemann." (3037-PS)
In the months after the occupation of the Sudetenland Hitler
made no secret of this meeting. In a speech before the
Reichstag on 80 January 1939, Hitler spoke as follows:
"On account of this intolerable provocation which had
been aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and
terrorization of our Germans there, I had resolved to
solve once and for all, and this time radically, the
Sudeten German question. On May 28 I ordered (1) that
preparations should be made for military action against
this state by October 2. I ordered (2) the immense and
accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the
West." (2360-PS)
Hitler also referred to this conference in his meeting with
President Hacha on 15 March 1939. (2798-PS)
Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler
issued the revised military directive for Case Green. This
directive is Item 11 in the Schmundt file (388-PS). Entitled
"Two front war with main effort in the Southeast," this
directive replaced the corresponding section, Part 2,
Section II, of the "Directive for Unified Preparation for
War" promulgated by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 (C-175).
This directive represented a further development of the
ideas for political and military action discussed by Hitler
and Keitel in their conference on 21 April. It is an
expansion of a rough draft submitted by Keitel to Hitler on
20 May, which may be found as Item 5 in the Sclnnundt file
(388-PS). It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were
made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter
from Keitel to General von Brauchitsch for the Army, to
Raeder for the Navy, and to Goering for the Luftwaffe. In
his
[Page 522]
covering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be
assured "as from 1 October 1938 at the latest". (388-PS,
Item 11)
This document, which is the basic directive under which the
Wehrmacht carried out its planning for Case Green, reads as
follows:
"1. Political Prerequisites.
"It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia
by military action in the near future. It is the job of
the political leaders to await or bring about the
politically and militarily suitable moment.
"An inevitable development of conditions inside
Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe
creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one
which may never come again may cause me to take early
action.
"The proper choice and determined and full utilization
of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of
success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at
once.
"2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the
Action.
"The following are necessary prerequisites for the
intended invasion:
"a. suitable obvious cause and, with it
"b. sufficient political justification,
"c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him
prepared to the least possible degree.
"From a military as well as a political standpoint the
most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as
the result of an incident through which Germany is
provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part
of world opinion will grant the moral justification of
military action.
"But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a
war, must terminate in sudden action on our partwhich
must have the elements of surprise as regards time and
extent before the enemy is so advanced in military
preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.
"3. Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".
a. For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise
element as the most important factor contributing to
success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory
measures already in peace-time and by an unexpectedly
rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to
create a situation within the first four days which
plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to
intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian
military situation and which at the same
[Page 523]
time will give nations with territorial claims on
Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately
against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by
Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be
expected, especially if Francedue to the obvious pro-
German attitude of Italy fears, or at least hesitates,
to unleash a European war by intervening against
Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to
Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be
expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the
land operations within the first few days, a European
crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give
commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold
action.
"b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate
Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of
resistance, on the other hand issue directions to
national groups for support in the Armed War and
influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I
reserve further directions and determination of the
date.
"4. Tasks of the Armed Forces.
"Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the
following basis:
"a. The mass of all forces must be employed against
Czechoslovakia.
"b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be
provided as rear cover which may be required, the other
frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are
merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be
watched.
"c. The sections of the army which can be rapidly
employed must force the frontier fortifications with
speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia
with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk
of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost
speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed
in such a way that the sections of the army which can
be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed
time at the same time as the penetration by the Air
Force before the enemy can become aware of our
mobilization.
"For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to
be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to
me for approval.
"5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.
"a. Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack
against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the
inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of
the field
[Page 524]
forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be
wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the
army that as many assault columns as possible be
employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the
Air Force. These assault columns the composition of
each, according to their tasks at that time must be
formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing
to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization
and to special measures of readiness. It must be the
purpose of these thrusts to break into the
Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points
and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve
a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For
the success of this operation, cooperation with the
Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from
the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or airborne
troops and with units of the sabotage service will be
of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of
frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of
preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into
Slovakia, of forcing a battle, of beating the
Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and
Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart
of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest
possible motorized and armored units using to the full
the first successes of the assault columns and the
effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover
provided for the West must be limited in numbers and
quality to the extent which suits the present state of
fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be
transported to the Western frontier immediately or held
back for the time being will be decided in my special
order. Preparations must however, be made to enable
security detachments to be brought up to the Western
frontier even during the strategic concentration
'Gruen'. Independent of this, a first security garrison
must be improvised from the engineers at present
employed in constructing fortifications and from
formations of the Labor Corps. The remaining frontiers
as well as East Prussia, are to be only weakly
protected. But, always depending on the political
situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the
bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the
Reich must be taken into account.
"b. Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive
forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in
bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The
frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is
crossed by the first section of the Army ***" (388-PS,
Item 11)
[Page 525]
After detailed instructions for action by the Luftwaffe and
by the Navy the directive continues as follows:
"In war economy it is essential that in the field of
the armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is
made possible through increased supplies. In the course
of operations, it is of value to contribute to the
reinforcement of the total war-economic strength by
rapidly reconnoitering and restarting important
factories. For this reason the sparing of
Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations
insofar as military operations permitcan be of decisive
importance to us." (388-PS, Item 11)
In other words, the Nazi conspirators, four months before -
the date of their planned attack, were already looking
forward bo the contribution which the Czech industrial plant
would make to the Nazi war economy. The last paragraph of
this directive reads as follows:
"All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be
made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and
according to the requirement of the branches of the
Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the
operations of the Army and Air Force.
"(Signed) ADOLF HITLER
"Certified copy "
(Signed) Zeitzler
"Oberstleutnant on the General Staff."
(388-PS, Item 11)
Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new
directive was prepared and initialed by Keitel. It does not
supersede the 30 May directive. It reads, in part:
"The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem
by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground
of my political intentions. I am determined to use to
the full every favorable political opportunity to
realize this aim."
"However, I will decide to take action against
Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the
case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and
the entry into Austria that France will not march and
therefore England will not intervene." "The directives
necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be
issued by me from time-to time "
"K [Initialed by Keitel]
"Z [Initialed by Zeitzler]"
(388-PS, Item 14)
[Page 526]
The second and third parts of this directive contain general
directions for the deployment of troops and for
precautionary measures in view of the possibility that,
during the execution of Case Green, France or England might
declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules
which follow this draft in the original have not been
translated into English. These schedules, which constitute
Item 15 in the Schmundt file (88-PS), give a time table of
specific measures for the preparation of the Army, Navy, and
Luftwaffe for the contemplated action.
Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is
found in three entries in General Jodl's diary written i the
spring of 1938 (1780-PS). Although the first entry is not
dated, it appears to have been written several months after
the annexation of Austria:
"After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that
there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because
Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless
preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out
energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on
the basis of the changed strategic position because of
the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see
memorandum L Ia of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on
21 April.
"The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech
problem as yet is changed because of the Czech
strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs
without any German threat and without the slightest
cause for it.
"Because of Germany's self restraint, its consequences
lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is
not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order
is issued for 'green' on 30 May."
*******
"Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further
conferences, which gradually reveal the exact
intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of
the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 8 and 9
June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)."
*******
"30 May: "The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he
states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia
soon and thereby initiates military preparation all
along the line. The previous intentions of the Army
must be changed considerably in the direction of an
immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-
Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the
Air Force. Further details are derived from directive
for strategic concentration of the army. The whole
contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's
intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion
of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most
certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are
not as yet equal to them." (1780-PS)
E. Luftwaffe Participation in Early Planning for Case Green.
During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also
engaged in planning in connection with the forthcoming Case
Green and the further expansion of the Reich. A Top Secret
Document, dated 2 June 1938, was issued by Air Group Command
3 and entitled "Plan Study 1938: Instruction for Deployment
and Combat: Case Red." (R-150). This is another staff plan,
this time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe
in the event of war with France. It is given significance by
the considerable progress, at this date, in planning for the
attack on Czechoslovakia. Various possibilities under which
war with France may occur are noted: all of them are
predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict:
"France will either interfere in the struggle between the Reich
and Czechoslovakia in the course of 'Case Green', or
"b start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia.
"c It is possible but not likely that France will begin
the fight, while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof."
"Regardless of whether France enters the war as a
result of 'Case Green' or whether she makes the opening
move of the war simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in
any case the mass of the German offensive formations
will, in conjunction with the Army, first deliver the
decisive blow against Czechoslovakia." (R-150)
By midsummer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was
being carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the
direction of the Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air
Attache in Prague reconnoitered the Freudenthal area of
Czechoslovakia, south of Upper Silesia, for suitable landing
grounds. This action is disclosed by a report of the
Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12
August 1938 (1536-PS). This was a Top Secret document, for
General Officers only, of which only
[Page 528]
two copies were made. Attached as an enclosure was the
report of Major Moericke, the German air attache in Prague,
dated 4 August 1938. The first four paragraphs of the
enclosure read: "I was ordered by the General Staff of the
Air Force to reconnoitre the land in the region
Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing possibilities.
"For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal
with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted
men in Prague.
"I had specifically ordered this man to give no details
about me to M, particularly about my official position.
"I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to
Freudenthal, taking precautions against being observed." (1536-PS)
By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia
compelled the issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed
intelligence memorandum entitled "Extended Case Green,"
which consisted of an estimate of possible action by the
Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia (375-PS).
This Top Secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of
the Luftwaffe General Staff is dated at Berlin,25 August
1938. Based on the assumption that Great Britain and France
will declare war on Germany during Case Green, this study
contains an estimate of the strategy and air strength of the
Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date for
Case Green. The first two sentences read as follows:
"The basic assumption is that France will declare war during
the Case Green. It is presumed that France will only decide
upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is
definitely assured." (375-PS)
F. Negotiations with Italy and Hungary about Case Green.
Knowledge of pending action against Czechoslovakia was not
confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich.
During the summer Germany's allies, Italy and Hungary, were
apprised by one means or another of the plans of the Nazi
conspirators. A captured document from German Foreign Office
files contains a confidential memorandum of a conversation
with the Italian ambassador, Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July
1938 (2800-PS). At the bottom is a handwritten note, headed
"For the Reichsminister [Ribbentrop] only." This note reads:
.
"Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear
to the Italians what our intentions are regarding
Czechoslovakia. He also knew the appointed time well
enough so that he could take perhaps a two months'
holiday now which he could not do later on.
[Page 529]
"Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments
Attolico mentioned that the Roumanian government had
refused to grant application for leave to its Berlin
Minister." (2800-PS)
A month later Mussolini sent a message to Berlin, asking
that he be told the date on which Case Green would take
place. The German response is outlined in a German Foreign
Office note on a conversation with Ambassador Attolico,
signed "R" for Ribbentrop) and dated 23 August 1938:
"On the voyage of the 'Patria' Ambassador Attolico explained
to me that he had instructions to request the notification
of a contemplated time for German action against
Czechoslovakia from the German government.
"In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation
against Germany, Germany would march. This would be
tomorrow, in six months or perhaps in a year. However,
I could promise him, that the German government, in
case of an increasing gravity of the situation or as
soon as the Fuehrer made his decision, would notify the
Italian-Chief of Government as rapidly as possible. In
any case, the Italian government will be the first one
who will receive such a notification.
"R (initial) ."
Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the
date of the pending attack. The conversation is recorded in
another German Foreign Office Memorandum:
"Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12
o'clock to communicate the following:
"He had received another written instruction from
Mussolini asking that Germany communicate in time the
probable date of action against Czechoslovakia.
Mussolini asked for such notification, as Mr. Attolico
assured me, in order 'to be able to take in due time
the necessary measures on the French frontier.'
''Berlin, 27 August 1938 R
"N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his
former demarche, that I could not impart any date to
him, that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the
first one to be informed of any decision.
"Berlin, 2 September 1938."
(2792-PS)
Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was
[Page 530]
from the first considered to be a possible participant in
Case Green. It will be recalled that in early March 1938
Keitel and Ribbentrop had exchanged letters on the question
of bringing Hungary into the Nazi planning (2786-PS). At
that time the decision was in the negative. But by mid-
August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to
persuade Hungary to join in the attack.
From August 21st to 26th Admiral Horthy and some of his
ministers visited Germany. Admiral Horthy witnessed the
launching of the Prince Eugen and conferred with Hitler.
There were discussions of the Czechoslovak question. A
captured German Foreign Office document, signed by von
Weizsacker, records the conversations between Hitler and
Ribbentrop and a Hungarian delegation consisting of Horthy,
Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S. S. Patria on 23 August 1938
(2796-PS). In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the
Hungarian attitude in the event of a German attack on
Czechoslovakia and suggested that such an attack would prove
to be a good opportunity for Hungary. The Hungarians, with
the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the Hungarian
intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to
commit themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop's
statement, and said:
"Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to
participate in the cooking as well." (2796 PS)
Von Weizsacker's memorandum reads as follows:
"Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary's attitude would
be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to
answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of
the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The
Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary
marches towards the North and perhaps the East.
Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been
started and 1 or 2 more years' time for its development
should be allowed.
"Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that
the Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were
between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone
would therefore not move. England and France would also
remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her
Empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference
to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation,
nothing definite could be predicted since it would
depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop repeated
that whoever desires revision must exploit the good
opportunity and participate.
"The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one.
[Page 531]
Upon the question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the
desired General Staff conferences were to have, not
much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire
of a mutual inventory of military material and
preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear
political basis for such a conferencethe time of
Hungarian interventionwas not obtained.
"In the meantime, more positive language was used by
von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not
to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude,
but he wished to put Hungary's intention to participate
on record. The Hungarian Ministers were and remained,
even later, more skeptical since they feel more
strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with
its unprotected flanks.
"When von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in
the afternoon, he was very relieved when the Fuehrer
explained to him, that, in regard to the situation in
question, he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself
would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the
meal would have to participate in the cooking as well.
Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs,
he would have no objections." (2796-PS)
By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to
note that in the event of a German-Czech conflict Hungary
would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October.
Another captured German Foreign Office Memorandum reports a
conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938.
The last paragraph of this memorandum states:
"Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of
a German-Czech conflict von Kanya mentioned several
days ago that his country would need a period of one to
two years in order to develop adequately the armed
strength of Hungary. During today's conversation von
Kanya corrected this remark and said that Hungary's
military situation was much better. His country would
be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take
part in the conflict by October 1st of this year."
(2797-PS)
The signature to this document is not clear, but it appears
to be that of von Weizsacker.
These accounts of the German-Hungarian conference are
corroborated by General Jodls diary. The entry for 21-26
August reads as follows:
"21-26 August:
"Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsver-
[Page 532]
weser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz.
"They arrive with the idea that in the course of a
great war, after a few years, and with the help of
German troops, the old state of Hungary can be
reestablished. They leave with the understanding that
we have neither demands from, nor claims against them,
but that Germany will not stand for a second
provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be
tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment,
it is up to them.
"Germany, however, will never play the role of
arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians
agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a
period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to
find out Yugoslavia's attitude." (1780-PS)
The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a
staff conference on 6 September. Jodl's diary entry for that
day states:
"6 September:
"Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder,
has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General
Staff Fischer.
"Before that he is briefed by me on the political
attitude of the Fuehrerespecially his order not to give
any hint on the exact moment. The same with Jodl,
General v. Stuelpnagel." (1 780-PS)
G. Final Preparations for the Attack.
The setting in which these events took place was that of the
Munich Pact and the international crisis which led to it. As
this crisis was developing in August and September 1938,
frantic efforts were being made by the statesmen of the
world to preserve the peace of the world. These-statesmen,
unfortunately, were unaware of the plans and designs of the
Nazi conspirators.
The documents captured by Allied troops reveal the hitherto-
unknown story underlying the Pact of Munich. These papers
reveal the fraud and deceit practiced by the Nazi
conspirators in negotiating the Pact of Munich as a stepping-
stone toward further aggression. The hope for peace which
came with the Munich Pact, which later turned out to be a
snare and a deceit, was a trap carefully set by the Nazi
conspirators. The nature of the trap is indicated by the
events of the weeks just preceding the Munich agreement.
With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a
[Page 533]
noticeable increase in the tempo of the military
preparations in late August and September. Actual
preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well
under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators were devoted
to technical details: the timing of X-day, questions of
mobilization, questions of transport and supply.
On 26 August Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled "Timing of
the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures" (388-PS,
Item 17). This memorandum demonstrates clearly the
complicity of the OKW and of Keitel and Jodl, in the
fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals
the character of the attack that Germany was preparing to
launch. The memorandum reads as follows:
"TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE
MEASURES
"The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces
by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably
leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-
order and to the demand that the X-order itself be
given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the
fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to
Czechoslovakia on that day.
"The army's efforts are tending in the opposite
direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance
measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will
contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the
mobilization. With this in mind OKW also demands that
the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.
"To this the following must be said:
"Operation (Aktion) Green will be set in motion by
means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia which will
give Germany provocation for military intervention. The
fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the
utmost importance.
"It must come at a time when weather conditions are
favorable for our superior air forces to go into action
and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it
to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.
"It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of
the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.
"On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely
receive an advance warning.
"If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action,
all further discussion is superfluous.
"For then no advance measures may be taken before X
minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation
as we
[Page 534]
shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the
incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance
measures must be given in good time and camouflaged
with the help of the numerous maneuvers and exercises.
"Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to
whether all Germans should be called back in time from
prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to
the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any
German subjects before the incident.
"Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in
Prague is impossible before the first air attack,
although the consequences could be very grave in the
event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.
g., death of representatives of friendly or confirmed
neutral powers.)
"If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be
considered desirable for the incident, then the
following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day
after that.
"In any case we must act on the principle that nothing
must be done before the incident which might point to
mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action
must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)
"It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a
great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and
that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in
good timeinsofar as the Abwehr Section is not also
charged with the organization of the incident.
"I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on
these points.
"J [Jodl] 26/8.
(388-PS, Item 17)
In handwriting at the bottom of the page are the notes of
Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. These reveal that the
memorandum was submitted to Hitler on 30 August; that Hitler
agreed to act along these lines; and that Jodl was so
notified on 31 August.
On 3 September Keitel and von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at
the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference (88-
PS, Item 18). The first three paragraphs of these minutes
state:
"Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch: Reports on the exact time of
the transfer of the troops to 'exercise areas' for
'Gruen'. Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From
here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes
known, field units carry out exercises in opposite
directions.
"Fuehrer: Has objection. Troops assemble field units a
2-
[Page 535]
day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises
everywhere.
" ?: OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27
September." (388-PS, Item 18)
During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views
on the strategy the German armies should employ and the
strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He
spoke of the possibility of "drawing in the Henlein people."
The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt
noted:
"The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the
Western fortifications; improvement of advance
positions around Aachen and Saarbrucken. Construction
of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery
pieces.)" (388-PS, Item 18)
Five days later General Stulpnagel asked Jodl for written
assurance that the OKH would be informed five days in
advance about the pending action. In the evening Jodl
conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the coordination of
ground and air operations at the start of the attack. The 8
September entry in General Jodl's diary states:
"8 September:
"General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that
the Army High Command will be informed five days in
advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add
that the overall meteorological situation can be
estimated to some extent only for two days in advance,
and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this
moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE) .
"General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he
wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not
being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers
would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as
if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though
he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added
that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is
reserved.
"I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing
the change of opinion about political and military
potentialities, according to directives of 24 June
1937, 5 November 1937, 7 December 1937, 30 May 1938,
with the last statements.
"In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that
the other nations will do everything they can to apply
pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but
because only very few people know the art of
withstanding this pressure successfully, the only
possible solution is to inform only a very small circle
of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and
[Page 536]
not to have it circulate through anterooms as
heretofore. "1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with
Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff
of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber,
Sternburg and myself) .
"We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-
Befehl), (X-1, 4 o'clock) and pre-announcement to the
Air Force (D-Day-1, X-1 day, 7 o'clock). The 'Y time'
has yet to be examined; some formations have an
approach flight of one hour." (1780-PS)
Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September,
Hitler met with Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and
Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer,
later joined the conference, which lasted from 10 in the
evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt's minutes
are Item 19 in his file (388-PS). In this meeting General
Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German
armies being committed to the attack: the 2d, 10th, 12th,
and 14th. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military
planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic
considerations which should be taken into account as the
attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows:
"General Oberst v. Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized
divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in
Austria and the difficulties in getting other divisions
(ready to march) into the area at the right time. In
the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of
Sept. if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the
23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to
decision by Army Command 2.
"The Fuehrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return
home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are
also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars,
they will stand around unnecessarily later on.
"General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction
of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West.
Trains must be assembled.
"v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will
be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed
(also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the
West." (388-PS, Item 19)
From this date forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied
with the intricate planning required before the attack. On
11 September Jodl conferred with a representative of the
Propa-
[Page 537]
ganda Ministry about method of refuting German violations of
International Law and exploiting those of the Czechs. The 11
September entry in the Jodl diary reads as follows:
"11 September:
"In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State
Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda on imminent common tasks.
"The joint preparations for refutation (Wiedrlegun) of
our own violations of international law, and the
exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were
considered particularly important." (1780-PS)
This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by
Section L, Jodl's section of the OKW (C-2). Seven copies of
this captured document were prepared and distributed on 1
October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftaffe, and the
Foreign Office. In this study anticipated violations of
International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are
listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the
propaganda agencies. This document is presented in a tabular
form, in which possible incidents are listed in the left-
hand column. In the second column are given specific
examples of the incidents; in the third and fourth columns
the position to be taken toward these incidents under
International -Law and under the laws of warfare is set
forth; the fifth column, which is blank, is reserved for the
explanation to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. The
first 10 hypothetical incidents, for which justification
must be found, and which are listed in column b of the table
are as follows:
"la. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is
destroyed.
"2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.
"3. The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on
Prague. "4. On account of a report that the Czechs have
used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.
"5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are
caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important
bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are
discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and
thereupon shot.
"6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are
detailed to do road work or to load munitions.
"7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition
billets, food stuffs and fodder from the Czech
population. As a result the latter suffer from want.
"8. Czech population is, for military reasons,
compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.
[Page 538]
"9. Churches are used for military accommodation.
"10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly
over Polish territory where they are involved in an air
battle with Czech aircraft." (C-2)
From Nurnberg, on 10 September, Hitler issued an order
bringing the Reicharbeitsdienst, the German labor service,
under the OKW. This top secret order, of which 25 copies
were made, provides as follows:
"1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command
of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15
September.
"2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments
of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs
Labor Leader (Reichsrbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments
from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy,
Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard
to competency he will make a final decision in
accordance with my instructions.
"3. For the time being this order is to be made known
only to the departments and personnel immediately
concerned.
"(signed) ADOLF HITLER."
(388-PS, Item 20)
Four days later, on 14 September, Keitel issued detailed
instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This
order is item 21 in the Schmundt file. A further order
issued by Jodl on 16 September specified RAD units which
would receive military training. This is Item 24 in the
Schmundt file. (388-PS)
Two entries in Jodl's diary give further indications of the
problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just
two weeks before the anticipated X-day. The entries for 15
and 16 September read as follows:
"15 September:
"In the morning conference with Chief of Any High
Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air
Forces; the question was discussed what could be done
if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due
to the rapid development of the situation.
"16 September:
"General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours.
He graphically describes the results of the conference
between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next
conference will take place on the 21st or 22nd in
Godesberg.
"With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the
[Page 539]
evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army
High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up
the VGAD along the Czech border.
"In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to
have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness
clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the
Army, so that it can be transported starting 28
September." (1780-PS)
The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available
which General Jodl referred to appears as Item 22 in the
Schmundt file. In this order Keitel told the railroads to be
ready by 28 September but to continue work on the western
fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of
camouflage. The first and fourth paragraphs of this order
provide:
"The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in
great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of
mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence
over all others."
"However, in accordance with the Fuehrers directive,
every effort should be made to continue to supply the
materials in as large quantities as feasible even after
20 September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage
as well as in order to continue the important work of
the Limes." (388-PS, Item 22)
The penultimate stage of the aggression began on 18
September. From that day until the 28th a series of orders
were issued advancing preparations for the attack. These
orders are included in the Schmundt file (388-PS). On the
18th the commitment schedule for the five participating
armiesthe 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14thwas set forth (388-
PS, Item 26). Hitler approved the secret mobilization of
five divisions in the west to protect the German rear during
Case Green 388-PS, Item 31). Further discussions were held
between the Army and the Luftwaffe about the time of day for
the attack. Conference notes initialed by Jodl and dated 27
September reveal the difference in views. These notes are
Item 54 in ie Schmundt file. The first three paragraphs
read:
"COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X
DAY.
"As a matter of principle, every effort should be made
for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X
Day.
"The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615.
It also wishes to conduct some limited operations in
the previous night, which however, would not alarm the
entire Czech front.
"Air Force's time of attack depends on weather
conditions.
[Page 540]
These could change the time of attack and also limit
the area of operations. The weather of the last few
days, for instance, would have delayed the start until
between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria."
(388-PS, Item 54)
A satisfactory solution appears to have been arrived at. The
last two paragraphs read:
"Thus it s proposed:
"Attack by the Army -- independent of the attack by the air
force -- at the time desired by the Army (0615) and
permission for limited operations to take place before
then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm
the entire Czech front.
"The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to
them. (J) " (388-PS, Item 54)
On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret
memorandum to Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for
the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is
Item 2 in the Schmundt file. It directs the Party officials
and organizations to comply with the demands of the Army
during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning
over equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of
this message read:
"As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and
Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the
Armed Forces, without the political situation being
aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or
corresponding codewords.
"Within the framework of these mobilization measures it
is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue
demands to the various Party authorities and their
organizations, which are connected with the previous
issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures
or special code names.
"The special situation makes it necessary that these
demands be met (even if the code word has not been
previously issued) immediately and without being
referred to higher authorities.
"OKW requests that subordinate offices be given
immediate instructions to this effect so that the
mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out
according to plan." 388-PS, Item 2)
Two additional entries from Jodl's diary reveal the extent
to which the Nazi conspirators carried forward their
preparations for attack even during the period of the
negotiations which
[Page 541]
culminated in the Munich Agreement. The entries for 26 and
27 September read:
"26 September:
"Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through
the Army High Command, has stopped the intended
approach march of the advance units to the Czech
border, because it is not yet necessary and because the
Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in
any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier
need be given on the 27th only.
"In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of
Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of
the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda for interference with possible Czech
propaganda transmissions. "Question by Foreign office
whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross
Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command: yes.
"1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
informs General Stumpf about the result of the
Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's
opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
"It is important that e do not permit ourselves to be
drawn into military engagements because of false
reports, before Prague replied.
"A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply
that on account of the weather situation, a
simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army
cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air
Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.
"The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander
in chief who is to have priority.
"The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the
Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any
decision as yet about commitment against Prague.
"2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the
world in an
important speech at the Sportspalast.
"27 September:
"1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of
attack being advanced to a line from where they can
arrive in the assembly area by 30 September." (1780-PS)
The order referred to by General Jodl in the last entry was
also recorded by the faithful Schmundt. It appears as Item 3
of the file. It is the order which brought the Nazi armies
to the jumping-off point for unprovoked aggression:
[Page 542]
"At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault
units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off
points.
"The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7
divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against
'Gruen' on September 30, the decision having been made
one day previously by 1200 noon." (388-PS, Item 33)
There follows a pencil note by Schmundt:
"This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320
through Major Schmundt." (388-PS, Item 33)
H. The Campaign Within Czechoslovakia.
The military preparations for aggression against
Czechoslovakia had not been carried out in vacuum. They had
been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to
promote civil disobedience to the Czechoslovak State. Using
the techniques they had already developed in other ventures,
the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money,
propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this
program the Nazis focussed their attention on the persons of
German descent living in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area
bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the north, west, and south.
The Czechoslovak government's official report for the
prosecution and trial of German major war criminals,
entitled "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia," sows the
background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue. (998-PS; 3061-
PS)
Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest
days of the NSDAP. In the years following the First World
War a German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which
maintained close contact with Hitler's NSDAP, was active in
the Sudetenland. In 1932, ringleaders of the Sudeten
Volksport, an organization corresponding to the Nazi SA,
openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler's program, the first
of which demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater
Germany. Soon thereafter they were charged with planning
armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were
sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic. Late in
1933 the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia
forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and
several of its chiefs escaped across the frontier. For a
year thereafter Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued
underground. (998-PS; 3061-PS)
On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of
the
[Page 543]
Nazi conspirators, Konrad Henlein, an instructor of
gymnastics, established the "German Home Front" (Deutsche
Heimatfront), which the following spring became the Sudeten
German Party (sudetendeutsche Partei SDP). Profiting from
the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party,
Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He
rejected pan-Germanism, and professed his respect for
individual liberties and his loyalty to "honest democracy"
and to the Czech state. His party, none-the-less, was built
on the basis of the Nazi Fuehrerprinzip, and he became its
Fuehrer. By 1937, when the power of Hitler's Germany had
become manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a
more aggressive note, demanding, without definition,
"complete Sudeten autonomy". The SDP laid proposals before
the Czech Parliament which would, in substance, have created
a state within a state. (998-PS; 3061-PS)
After the annexation of Austria in March 1938 the
Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi
model, intensified their activity. Undisguised anti-Semitic
propaganda started in the Henlein press; the campaign
against "bolshevism" was intensified; terrorism in the
Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm troop
organization, patterned and trained on the principles of the
Nazi SS, was established, known as the FS (Freiwilliger
Selbstschutz, or Voluntary Vigilantes). On 24 April 1938, in
a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary, Henlein came
into the open with his "Karlsbad Program". In this speech,
which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted
the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess "German
political philosophy?', which, it was clear, meant National
Socialism. (998-PS; 3061-PS)
As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every
technique of the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in the
Czech official report, these included:
(1) Espionage. Military espionage was conducted by the SDP,
the FS, and by other members of the German minority on
behalf of Germany. Czech defenses were mapped, and
information on Czech troop movements was furnished to the
German authorities.
(2) Nazification of German Organizations in Czechoslovakia.
The Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of
the German population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and
social and cultural centers gradually underwent
"Gleichschaltung", i.e., "purification, by the SDP. Among
the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sport
societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and
choral societies. The Henleinists
[Page 544]
were particularly interested in penetrating as many business
institutions as possible and in bringing over to their side
the directors of banks, the owners or directors of
factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case
of Jewish ownership or direction they attempted to secure
the cooperation of the clerical and technical staffs of the
institution.
(3) German Direction and Leadership. The Henleinists
maintained permanent contact with the Nazi officials
designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia.
Meetings in Germany at which Henleinists were exhorted and
instructed in Fifth Column activity were camouflaged by
being held in conjunction with Saenger Feste (choral
festivals), gymnastic shows and assemblies, and commercial
gatherings such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi
conspirators needed incidents for their war of nerves, it
was the duty of the Henleinists to supply them.
(4) Propaganda. Disruptive and subversive propaganda was
beamed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed
in the German press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a "nest
of Bolshevism" and spread the false report of "Russian
troops and airplanes" centered in Prague. Under direction
from the Reich the Henleinists maintained whispering
propaganda in the Sudetenland, which contributed to the
mounting tension and to the creation of incidents. Illegal
Nazi literature was smuggled from Germany and widely
distributed in the border regions. The Henlein press more or
less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German population.
(5) Murder and Terrorism. The Nazi conspirators provided the
Henleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms
with which to provoke incidents and to maintain a state of
permanent unrest. Gendarmes, customs officers, and other
Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was established
against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. The
Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population, and the
Nazi Gestapo crossed into border districts to carry
Czechoslovak citizens across the border to Germany. In
several cases political foes of the Nazis were murdered on
Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor Theodor Lessing
in 1933 and the engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were anti-
Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to
power and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. (998-PS; 3061-
PS)
Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for
pretense and deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and
frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi
conspirators. This statement was made in a lecture by Konrad
Hen-
[Page 545]
lein quoted on page 29 of "Four Fighting Years", a
publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In this lecture, delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the
Auditorium of the University of Vienna under the auspices of
the Wiener Verq tungsakalame, he discussed the "fight for
the liberation of the Sudetens" in the following terms:
"National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten Germans.
Our struggle was of a different character from that in
Germany. Although we had to behave differently in
public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the
National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we
might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany
was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be
waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National
Socialism, persons who were true followers of our
Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought
me out to be the leader of the national group in its
final struggle. When *** in autumn, 1933, the leaders
of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political
leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a difficult
problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party
continue to be carried on illegally or should the
movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of
the Sudeten Germans and in order to prepare their
return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage
and by methods which appeared quite legal to the
outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second
alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of
our national group was at stake. It would certainly
have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally
exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of
confessing allegiance to National Socialism and
entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than
doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled
the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a
bastion in the alliance against the German Reich."
(2863-PS.)
1. Evidence Implicating Nazi Conspirators in Czechoslovak
Agitation.
The foregoing account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia is
the outline of this conspiracy as it had been pieced
together by the Czechoslovak government early in the summer
of 1945. Since then captured documents and other information
made available since the defeat of Germany have clearly and
conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto
could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the
Sudetenland agitation.
[Page 546]
A telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16
March 1938 to the Foreign Office in Berlin, presumably
written by the German Minister, Eisenlohr, proves
conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument of
the Nazi conspirators (3060-PS). The Henlein party, it
appears from this telegram, was directed from Berlin and
from the German Legation in Prague. It could have no policy
of its own; even the speeches of its leaders had to be
coordinated with the German authorities. This telegram reads
as follows:
"Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have
thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had
shunned me, and with Frank separately and received
following promises;
"1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by
the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy
and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives
are to be complied with implicitly.
"2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated
uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of
"Zeit" (Time) is to be improved.
"3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent
line which in the end might lead to political
complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of
Sudeten German interests. The objectives are to be set
in every case with my participation and to be promoted
by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection
of nationalities (Volksschutzesetze) and 'territorial
autonomy' are no longer to be stressed.
"4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required
or desired before Henlein issues important statements
on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared
through the Mission.
"5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for
German agencies is to be transmitted through the
Legation.
"6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week,
and will come to Prague at any time if requested.
"I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm
control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming
developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please
inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central
Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support
this uniform direction of the Sudeten German Party."
(3060-PS)
The dressing-down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had
the desired effect. The day after the telegram was
dispatched from Prague, Henlein addressed a humble letter to
Ribbentrop, asking an early personal conversation (2789-PS).
This letter,
[Page 547]
dated 17 March 1938, and captured in the German Foreign
Office files, states:
"Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:
"In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of
events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our
gratitude to all those ho had a share in this new grand
achievement of our Fuehrer.
"I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept
accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans
herewith.
"We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by
doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German
policy.
"The new situation requires a reexamination of the
Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask
you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.
"In view of the necessity of such a clarification I
have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress,
originally scheduled for 26 March 1938 and 27 March
1938, for 4 weeks.
"I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and
one of my closest associates would be allowed to
participate in the requested talks.
"Heil Hitler,
"Loyally yours,
"/s/ Konrad Henlein."
This letter makes it clear that Henlein was quite aware that
the seizure of Austria made possible the adoption of a new
policy toward Czechoslovakia. It also reveals that he was
already in close enough contact with Ribbentrop and the
German minister in Prague to feel free to suggest "early
personal" talks.
Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein's suggestion. The
conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign
Office in Berlin on 29 March 1938. The previous day Henlein
had conferred with Hitler himself. The captured German
Foreign Office notes of the conference on 29 March read as
follows:
"The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the
necessity to keep the conference which had been
scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view
of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given
to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that
there were two questions which were of outstanding
importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten
German Party ***"
*******
[Page 548]
"The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the
Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian
Government is finally this: to avoid entry into the
Government by the extension and gradual specification
of the demands to be made. It must be emphasized
clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German
Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the
Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet
(Reichsregierung). The Reich Cabinet itself must refuse
to appear toward the Government in Prague or toward
London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the
Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident
prerequisite that during the impending discussion with
the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten Germans would
be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain
quiet and discipline, and would avoid indiscretions.
The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this
connection were satisfactory.
"Following these general explanations of the Reich
Minister the demands of the Sudeten German Party from
the Czechoslovak Government as contained in the
enclosure were discussed and approved in principle. For
further cooperation, Konrad Henlein was instructed to
keep in the closest possible touch with the
Reichsminister and the Head of the Central Office for
Racial Germans (mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen
Mittelstelle), as well as the German Minister in
Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign
Minister. The task of the German Minister in Prague
would be to support the demands of the Sudeten German
Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more
private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without
exerting any direct influence on the extent of the
demands of the Party.
"In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would
be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate
with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially
with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the
Party should have the discretion to keep a loose
contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a
parallel course by them might appear appropriate.
"Berlin, 29 March 1938.
"R [Initial]"
Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is
the list of those who attended. Konrad Henlein, his
principal deputy, Karl Hermann Frank, and two others
represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor Haushofer
and SS Obergrup-
[Page 549]
penfuehrer Lorenz represented the Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle, the Central Office for Racial Germans. The
Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of eight.
These eight included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting
and did most of the talking, von Mackensen, Weiszacker, and
Minister Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague. (2788-
PS)
In May Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with
the Nazi conspirators. At this time the plans for Case
Green, the attack on Czechoslovakia, were already on paper,
and it may be assumed that Henlein was briefed on the role
he was to play during the summer months. The entry for 22
May 1938 in General Jodl's diary reads as follows:
"22 May: Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and
K. Henlein" (see enclosure). (1780-PS)
The enclosure, unfortunately, is missing.
It will be recalled that in his speech in Vienna, Henlein
had admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi
conspirators in the fall of 1933 to take over the political
leadership of the Sudeten Germans (2863-PS). The foregoing
documents show conclusively the nature of Henlein's mission.
They demonstrate that Henlein's policy, his propaganda, eve
his speeches were controlled by Berlin. Furthermore, from
the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party had been secretly
subsidized by the German Foreign Office. A secret
memorandum, captured in the German Foreign Office files,
signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19 August 1938, was
occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for
additional funds. This memorandum reads
MEMORANDUM
"The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the
Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain
amounts, consisting of a monthly payment of 15,000
Marks; 12,000 Marks of this are transmitted to the
Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000 Marks are
paid out to the Berlin representation of the party
(Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months
the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased
considerably due to the current negotiations with the
Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps
which are produced and disseminated has risen; the
propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely;
the expense accounts have increased especially because
due to the necessity for continuous good information,
the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris
(including the financing of travels of Sudeten German
deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier.
Under these conditions the
[Page 550]
Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the
monthly allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do
everything required. Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied
to this office for an increase of this amount, from
3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the
considerable increase in the business transacted by the
Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity
of the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the
Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest
support.
"Herewith submitted to the Dep: Pers(onnel) with a
request for approval. It is requested to increase the
payments with retroactive effect from 1 August.*
"Berlin, 19 August 1938
/s/ Woermann
"*Volkesdeutsche Mittelstelle (Central Office for
Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept.
[handwritten marginal note]." (3059-PS; also 3061-PS)
As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved
forward in the late summer and early fall of 1938, the Nazi
command made good use of Henlein and his followers. About
the first of August the Air Attache at the German Legation
in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions from
Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten German
leader in Freudenthal. With his assistance, and in the
company of the local leader of the FS (the Henlein
equivalent of the SS), he reconnoitered the surrounding
countryside to select possible airfield sites for German
use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in
the uniform of the Czech armya fact which, the attache
noted, served as excellent camouflage.
The Air Attache's report reads in part as follows:
"The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German
Glider Pilots in Freudenthal and said to be absolutely
reliable by my trusted men. My personal impression
fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity
was made to him, although I had the impression that M.
knew who I was.
"At my request, with which he complied without any
question, M. travelled with me over the country in
question. We used M.'s private car for the trip.
"As M. did not know the country around Beneschau
sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of
the FS, a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial
Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For
reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with
thiswithout actually saying so.
[Page 551]
"As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I
photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said
'Aha, so you're looking for airfields !' I answered
that we supposed that, in the case of any serious
trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields
immediately behind the line of fortifications and that
I had the intention of looking over the country from
that point of view." (1536-PS)
In the latter part of the Air Attache's report reference is
made to the presence of reliable agents and informers ( V-
Leute) apparently drawn from the ranks of the Henlein Party
in this area. It was indicated that these agents were in
touch with the Abwehrstelle, the intelligence office in
Breslau. (1536-PS)
In September, when the propaganda campaign was reaching its
height, the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on
the Sudeten demands for autonomy. They attempted to use the
Slovaks as well. On 19 September the Foreign Office in
Berlin sent the following telegram to the German Legation in
Prague:
"Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein's
request, to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and
induce them to start their demands for autonomy
tomorrow.
"(signed) ALTENBURG"
Kundt was Henlein's representative in Prague.
As the harassed Czech government sought to stem the disorder
in the Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to
threatening diplomatic tactics in a deliberate effort to
increase the tension between the two countries. Four
telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Legation
in Prague, dispatched between the 16 September 1938 and 24
September 1938, are self-explanatory. The first telegram is
dated 16 September:
"Tonight 160 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood
were arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to
the arrest of Sudeten Germans since the Fuehrer's
speech of 12 September. I request you to ascertain the
number of Sudeten-Germans arrested since 12 September
as extensively as possible. The number of those
arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by
the Gestapo cable report.
"Woermann." (2855-PS)
The second telegram is dated 17 September. The first two
paragraphs read:
"I. Request to inform the local government immediately
of the following:
"The Reich Government has decided that:
"(a) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech
descent,
[Page 552]
Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in
Germany as Sudeten Germans have been in Czechoslovakia
since the beginning of the week.
"(b) If any Sudeten Germans should be executed pursuant
to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number
of Czechs will be shot in Germany." (2854-PS)
The third telegram was sent on 24 September:
"According to information received here Czechs have
arrested 2 German frontier-policemen, seven customs-
officials and 30 railway-officials. As countermeasure
all the Czech staff in Marschegg were arrested. We are
prepared to exchange the arrested Czech officials for
the German officials. Please approach Government there
and wire result.
WOERMANN" (2853-PS)
On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched. The last
paragraph read:
"Confidential:
"Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the
prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by
military courts against Sudeten-Germans is, of course,
out of question.
"WOERMANN"
(2856-PS)
In the latter half of September Henlein devoted himself and
his followers wholeheartedly to preparation for the coming
German attack. About 15 September, after Hitler's
provocative Nurnberg speech in which he accused "this Benes"
of "torturing" and planning the "extermination" of the
Sudeten Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his
principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the
Czech government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the
powerful Reichssender radio station his determination to
lead the Sudeten Germans "home to the Reich" and denounced
"the Hussite Bolshevik criminals of Prague". From his
headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth, he
kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators,
including Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along
the border and began the organization of the Sudeten German
Free Corps, an auxiliary military organization. These events
are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS;
3061-PS)
Henlein's activities were carried on with the advice and
assistance of the Nazi leaders. Lt. Col. Koechling was
assigned to Hen-
[Page 553]
lein in an advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten
German Free Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the night
of 17 September Koechling received far-reaching military
powers. At this conference the purpose of the Free Corps was
frankly stated: the "maintenance of disorder and clashes".
Item 2, of the Schmundt file (388-PS), a telegram labeled
Most Secret reads as follows:
"Last night conference took place between Fuehrer and
Oberstleutnant Koechling. Duration of conference 7
minutes. Lt. Col. Koechling remains directly
responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad
Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received far-
reaching military plenary powers from the Fuehrer. The
Sudeten German Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad
Henlein alone. Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten
Germans and maintenance of disturbances and clashes.
The Free Corps will be established in Germany. Armament
only with Austrian weapons. Activities of Free Corps to
begin as soon as possible." (388-PS, Item 25)
General Jodl's diary gives a further insight into the
position of the Henlein Free Corps. At this time the Free
Corps was engaged in active skirmishing along the Czech
border, furnishing incidents and provocation in the desired
manner. Jodl's entries for 19 September 1938 and 20
September 1938 state:
"19 September:
"Order is given to the Army High Command to take care
of the Sudeten German Free Corps. "20 September:
"England and France have handed over their demands in
Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The
activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an
extent that they may bring about, and already have
brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the
Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech
Army to the proximity of the border.) By checking with
Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities
into normal channels. "Toward the evening the Fuehrer
also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with
groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the
Corps HQ." (1780-PS)
A report from Henlein's staff, which was filed in Hitler's
headquarters, boasted of the offensive operations of the
Free Corps in the following terms:
"Since 19 Sept.in more than 300 missionsthe Free Corps
has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack
and with a willingness often reaching a degree of
unqualified
[Page 554]
self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its
activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MGs and a
large amount of weapons and equipment, aside from
serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by the
enemy." (388-PS, Item 30)
In this document the word "attack" was subsequently crossed
out, and the word "defense substituted. Similarly "the
enemy" was changed to read "the Czech terrorists".
In his headquarters in the castle at Dondorf, Henlein was in
close touch with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence
Division of the OKW and with the SS and SA. The liaison
officer between the SS and Henlein was Oberfuehrer Gottlob
Berger, who in later years became prominent in the SS
command. An affidavit executed by Berger reads as follows:
"I, GOTTLOB BERGER, under oath and being previously
sworn, make the following statement:
"1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of
Oberfuehrer in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned
as SS Liaison Officer with Konrad Henleins Sudeten
German Free Corps at their headquarters in the castle
of Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this position I was
responsible for all liaison between the Reichsfuehrer
SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was
delegated to select from the Sudeten Germans those who
appeared eligible for membership in the SS or VT
(Verfuegungs Truppe). In addition to myself, Liaison
Officers stationed with Henlein included an
Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name I have
forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from
the SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of
the OKW Abwehr, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two
days and conferred with Henlein.
"2. In the course of my official duties at Henleins
headquarters I became familiar with the composition and
activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being
formed under Henleins direction: One in the Eisenstein
area, Bavaria; one in the Bayreuth area; one in the
Dresden area; and possibly a fourth group in Silesia.
These groups were supposedly composed of refugees from
the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into
Germany, but they actually contained Germans with
previous service in the SA and NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps)
as well. These Germans formed the skeleton of the Free
Corps. On paper the Free Corps had a strength of 40000
men. I do not know its actual strength, but I believe
it to be considerably smaller than the paper
[Page 555]
figure. The Corps was armed with Manlicher-Schoenauer
rifles from Army depots in Austria. It was my
understanding that about 18000 rifles were issued to
men under Henleins command. In addition, small numbers
of machine guns [(Rifles and machine guns were of
doubtful serviceability due to inferior ammunition).],
hand grenades, and 2 captured antitank guns were placed
at Henleins disposal. Part of the equipment furnished
to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking utensils, and
blankets, were supplied by the SA.
"3. In the days preceding the conclusion of the four-
power pact at Munich I heard of numerous occasions on
which the Henlein Free Corps was engaged in skirmishes
with Czech patrols along the border of the Sudetenland.
These operations were under the direction of Henlein,
who went forward from his Headquarters repeatedly to
take direct command of his men.
"The facts stated above are true; this declaration is
made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after
reading over this statement I have signed and executed
the same.
"(Signed) Gottlob Berger"
Henlein and his Free Corps were also acting in collaboration
with the SD, (Sicherheitsdienst) Himmlers intelligence
organization. An affidavit executed by Alfred Helmut
Naujocks, a member of the SD, reads as follows:
"I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn,
depose and state as follows:
"1. In September 1938 I was working in Amt III of the
SD. (The department which was then called Amt III later
became Amt IV). In the course of my work I travelled
between Berlin, Hof and Munich.
"2. While in Hof, which is on the Czech border, I paid
repeated visits to the SD Service Department, that is,
Intelligence Office, which had been established there.
This Service Department had the task of collecting all
political intelligence emanating from the Czechoslovak
border districts and passing it on to Berlin.
Continuous day and night teleprinter communications had
been established from Hof direct to Amt II of the SD in
Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of the
Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin
at this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert.
[Page 556]
"3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from
Henlein Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a
castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth; the distance
between Hof and Bayreuth is not very great, and we had
daily access to all intelligence received by the Free
Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained with
Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this
Intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and
was placed before Heydrich and Himmler.
"4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous
complaints that they had not received sufficient supply
of arms. Negotiations by letter and teleprint message
went on for a number of days with Berlin until it
became quite a nuisance. After that arms were supplied
from the army, but I believe it was only a small
quantity.
"5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected
by the SD on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had
agents all along the border in every town. The names of
these agents were reported to Hof, and two motor cars
toured the border every day to collect the intelligence
which had been unearthed. In addition, I remember that
two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units were
stationed in the neighborhood of Asch.
"The facts stated above are true: this declaration is
made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after
reading over this statement I have signed and executed
the same at Nurnberg, Germany this 20th day of November
1945.
" (signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks."
Offensive operations along the Czechoslovak border were not
confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two SS
Totenkopf battalions were operating across the border in
Czech territory near Asch. Item 36 in the Schmundt file (388-
PS), an OKW most secret order signed by Jodl and dated 28
September, states:
"Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch
Promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will
come under the C in C Army only when they return to
German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the
German-Czech frontier." (388-PS, Item 36)
According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl's diary
these SS Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on
direct orders from Hitler. (1780-PS)
As the time for X-day approached, the disposition of the
Free Corps became a matter of dispute. On 26 September
Himmler
[Page 557]
issued an order to the Chief of Staff of the Sudeten German
Free CorPs directing that the Free Corps come under control
of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the event of German invasion of
Czechoslovakia (388-PS, Item 37). On 28 September Keitel
directed that as soon as the German Army crosses the Czech
border the Free Corps will take orders from the OKH. In this
most secret order o the OKW Keitel discloses that Henlein's
men are already operating in Czechoslovak territory:
"For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to
this the principle remains valid, that they receive
instructions direct from the Fuehrer and that they
carry out their operations only in conjunction with the
competent general staff corps. The advance units of the
Free Corps will have to report to the local commander
of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the
frontier.
"Those units remaining forward of the frontier shouldin
their own interestsget into communication with the
frontier guard as often as possible.
"As soon as the army crosses the Czech border the
Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus
it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free
Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of
army boundaries later." (388-PS, Item 34)
On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich
settlement would result in a peaceful occupation of the
Sudetenland, Keitel ordered that the Free Corps Henlein in
its present composition be placed under command of Himmler:
"1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:
"The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just
ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present
composition be placed under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS
and Chief of German Police.
"It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as
field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn
in like the rest of the police forces for police duties
in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS." (388-PS, Item
38)
J. Occupation of the Sudetenland under the Terms of the
Munich Agreement.
Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with
war in fact about to be launched, the United Kingdom and
France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on
the night of 29 September 1938. This treaty provided for the
cession of the
[Page 558]
Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was
required to acquiesce. (TC-23)
On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the
Sudetenland.
During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the Wehrmacht had
been fully deployed for attack, awaiting only the word of
Hitler to begin the assault. With the cession of the
Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30 September Keitel
promulgated Directive #1 on "Occupation of territory
separated from Czechoslovakia" (388-PS, Item 9). This
directive contained a time table for the occupation of
sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10 October
and specified the tasks of the German armed forces. The
fourth and fifth paragraphs provided:
"2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:
"The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be
maintained completely, for the present also in the
West. Order for the rescinding of measures taken is
held over.
"The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can
easily be converted into operation 'Gruen'." (388-PS,
Item 9) It contained one further provision about the
Henlein forces: "Henlein Free Corps. All combat action
on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from
1st October." (388-PS, Item 9)
The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW
directives giving instructions for the occupation of the
Sudetenland and showing the scope of the preparations of the
OKW. Directives specifying the occupational area of the army
and the units under its command; arranging for
communications facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and
propaganda; and giving instructions to the civil departments
of the government were issued over Keitel's signature on 30
September (388-PS, Items 40, 41, 42). By 10 October von
Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German troops
had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the
occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW
requested Hitler's permission to rescind Case Green, to
withdraw troops from the occupied area and to relieve the
OKH of executive powers in the Sudeten German area as of 15
October. (388-PS, Items 46, 47, 49)
On 18 October, in a formal letter to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Hitler announced
that the civil authorities would take over responsibility
for the Sudeten German territory on 21 October and that the
OKH would be relieved of executive powers as of that date
(388-P, Item 51). On the same date additional demobilization
of the forces in the
[Page 559]
Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Keitel. Three days
later the OKW requested Hitler's consent to the reversion of
the RAD from the control of the armed forces. (388-PS, Items
52, 53)
As the German forces entered the Sudetenland Henlein's
Sudetendeutsche Parte was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler.
The two men who had fled to Hitler's protection in mid-
September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, were appointed
Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the
Sudetengau. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that
were still free the Sudetendeutsche Partei constituted
itself as the NationalSozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-
Partei in der Tschechoslovake (NSDAP in Czechoslovakia)
under the direction of Kundt, another of Henlein's deputies.
These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official
report. (998-PS; 3061-PS)
The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi
conspirators.
K. Planning for the Conquest of the Remainder of
Czechoslovakia.
With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of
the German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich it might
have been expected that the Nazi conspirators would be
satisfied. Thus far in the Nazi program of aggression the
conspirators had used as a pretext for their conquests the
union of the Volksdeutsche, the people of German descent,
with the Reich. Now, after Munich, substantially all the
Volksdeutsche in Czechoslovakia had been returned to German
rule. On 26 September, at the Sportspalast in Berlin, Hitler
spoke these words:
"And now we are confronted with the last problem which
must be solved and which will be solved. It is the last
territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but
it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and which I
will satisfy, God willing."
*******
"I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr.
Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him
that the German people want nothing but peace; but I
have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the
limits of our patience.
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that
when this problem is solved there will be no more
territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I
further assured him that from the moment when
Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to
say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with
their other minorities peacefully and with-
[Page 560]
out oppression, I will no longer be interested in the
Czech State. And that as far as I am concerned I will
guarantee. We don't want any Czechs at all." (2358-PS)
Yet no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were
preparing estimates of the military forces required to break
Czechoslovak resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. Item 48 of
the Schmundt file is a top secret telegram sent by Keitel to
Hitler's headquarters on 11 October 1938 in answer to four
questions which Hitler had propounded to the OKW. These were
the questions:
"Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the
present situation to break all Czech resistance in
Bohemia and Moravia ?
"Question 2: How much time is required for the
regrouping or moving up of new forces?
"Question 3: How much time will be required for the
same purpose if it is executed after the intended
demobilization and return measures?
"Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve
the state of readiness of October 1st?" (388-PS, Item
48)
Whereupon, in the same telegram, Keitel reported to Hitler
the considered answers of the OKH and the Luftwaffe.
On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of
the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities,
a directive outlining plans for the conquest of the
remainder of Czechoslovakia was signed by Hitler and
initialed by Keitel. In this Top Secret Order, of which 10
copies were made, the Nazi conspirators, only three weeks
after the winning of the Sudetenland, were already looking
forward to new conquests:
"The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the
preparations for the conduct of war resulting from
these tasks will be laid down by me in a later
Directive.
"Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces
must be prepared at all times for the following
eventualities:
"1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the
protection against surprise air attacks.
"2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
"3. The occupation of the Memelland."
*******
"It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder
of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile
towards Germany.
"The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for
this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent
than those
[Page 561]
for 'Gruen'; they must, however, guarantee a continuous
and considerably higher state of preparedness, since
planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with.
The organization, order of battle and state of
readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are
in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault
that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all
possibility of organized resistance. The object: is the
swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting
off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that
at the same time 'Grenzsicherng West' (the measures of
frontier defense in the West) can be carried out.
"The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as
follows:
"The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia
and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for
a surprise type of attack. Their number will be
determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a
quick and decisive success must be assured. The
assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked
out. Forces not needed will b kept in readiness in such
a manner that they may be either committed in securing
the frontiers or sent after the attack army.
"b. Air Force
"The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured
by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.
"For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack
from peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for
this purpose still stronger forces may be required can
only be determined from the development of the military
situation in Czechoslovakia. At the same time a
simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive
forces against the West must be prepared." (C-136)
This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel.
It was distributed to the OKH, to Goering's Luftwaffe, and
to Raeder at Navy headquarters.
Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an
appendix to the original order stating that by command of
the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of
Czechoslovakia are to continue. Distribution of this Top
Secret order was the same as or the 21 October order. The
order provides:
"2. COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38.
"Reference 'Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia'
the Fuehrer has given the following additional order:
"The preparations for this eventuality are to continue
on the
[Page 562]
assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be
expected.
"To the outside world too it must clearly appear that
it is merely an action of pacification and not a
warlike undertaking.
"The action must therefore be carried out by the peace
time Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from
mobilization. The necessary readiness for action,
especially the ensuring that the most necessary
supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment
within the units.
"Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march
must, as a general rule, leave their stations only
during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier,
and will not previously form up systematically on the
frontier. The transport necessary for previous
organization should be limited to the minimum and will
be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary
movements, if any, of single units and particularly of
motorized forces, to the troop-training areas situated
near the frontier, must have the approval of the
Fuehrer.
"The Air Force should take action in accordance with
the similar general directives.
"For the same reasons the exercise of executive power
by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only
for the newly occupied territory and only for a short
period.
"Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"KEITEL" (C-138)
This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed
in ink by Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German
naval headquarters. It bears the initials of Fricke, head of
the Operational Division of the Naval War Staff, of
Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff, and of
Raeder.
As the Wehrmacht moved forward with plans for what it
clearly considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign
Office played its part. In a discussion of means of
improving German-Czech relations with the Czechoslovak
Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in Berlin on 21 January 1939,
Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech government a "quick
reduction" in the size of the Czech army. The captured
German Foreign Office notes of this discussion bear the
following footnote, in Ribbentrop's handwriting:
"I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick
reduction in the Czech army would be decisive in our
judgment." (2795-PS)
[Page 563]
L. Extension of Fifth Column Activity
As in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi
conspirators did not intend to rely on the Wehrmacht alone
to accomplish their calculated objective of "liquidating"
Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from
Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the cry, "home to
the Reich." One sizeable minority, the Slovaks, remained
within the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Government
had made every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the
months after the cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had
been granted to Slovakia, with an autonomous cabinet and
parliament at Bratislava. Nonetheless, despite these
concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators
found men ready to take their money and do their bidding.
The following picture of Nazi operations in Slovakia is
based on the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS; 3061-PS)
Nazi propaganda and "research" groups had long been
interested in maintaining close connections with the Slovak
autonomist opposition. When Bela Tuka, who later became
Prime Minister of the puppet state of Slovakia, was tried
for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established
that he had already established connections with Nazi groups
within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close
contact with Slovak traitors living in exile and were
attempting to establish more profitable contacts in the semi-
fascist Slovak Catholic Peoples Party of Monsignor Andrew
Hlinka. Out of sympathy with the predominantly anti-clerical
government in Prague, some Catholic elements in Slovakia
proved willing to cooperate with the Nazis. In February and
July 1938 the leaders of the Henlein movement conferred with
top men of Father Hlinka's party and agreed to- furnish one
another with mutual assistance in pressing their respective
claim to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the
September agitation when, at the proper moment, the Foreign
Office in Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague
to tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy.
(See 2858-PS.)
By this time, mid-summer 1938, the Nazis were in direct
contact with figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and
had paid agents among the higher staff of Father Hlinka's
party. These agents undertook to render impossible any
understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak
parties in the government at Prague. Franz Karmasin, later
to become Volksgruppenfuehrer had been appointed Nazi leader
in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak
autonomy while on the Nazi pay roll. On 22 November the
Nazis indiscreetly wired
[Page 564]
Karmasin to collect his money at the German Legation in
person. The telegram, sent from the German Legation at
Prague to Bratislava (Pressburg), reads as follows:
"Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin
that he would appreciate it if he could personally draw
the sum which is being kept for him at the treasury of
the embassy.
"HENCKE" (2859-PS)
Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. A
captured memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated
Berlin, 29 November 1939 eight months after the conquest of
Czechoslovakiathrows a revealing light both on Karmasin and
on the German Foreign Office:
"On the question of payments to KARMASIN
"Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples'
League for Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from
then on 15,000 Marks monthly.
"Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans
(Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) has deposited 300,000
Marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in
Bratislava (Pressburg) on which he could fall back in
an em